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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No- 920342-CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG,

Priority #2

Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(f) and Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 26.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
a.

Did the Court fail to dispose the charges against the

defendant within the 120 days as required by §77-29-1 U.C.A.?
b.

Were the primary delays in the disposition of the case a

result of the maneuvers of procedure exercised by the state?
c.

Should the Court have granted the defense's Motion to

Dismiss both counts I and II?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
A.

There are no determinative constitutional provisions.

B.

Statutory Provisions - UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1 (1953, as

amended).
§77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending chargeDuties of custodial officer-Continuance may be grantedDismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment

in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional
institution of this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden,
sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any
appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and court wherein it is pending and
requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days
of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff, or custodial officer, upon receipt
of the demand described in subsection (1), shall immediately
cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate
prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff,
or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting
attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such
information concerning the term of commitment of the
demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in
subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or
his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within
120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted,
and the defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney is not
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the
matter dismissed with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals the judgment, sentence, and commitment
resulting from his conviction of Aggravated Assault, a Third
Degree Felony, in violation of §76-5-103, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended.
The defendant was charged with Aggravated Assault, a Third
Degree Felony, in relation to an event alleged to have occurred
on or about June 14, 1991 in Utah County, Utah.

On July 12,

1991, the State of Utah filed an information charging the
defendant with aggravated assault. (Exhibit 1). The information
2

was based upon an investigation by the Orem police who discovered
that the assailant had used a gun to strike the victim's head and
fire upon him. (Exhibit 2).

On August 5, 1991, the defendant

appeared before the Court and requested a preliminary
examination.

The preliminary examination was held on October 21,

1991 and the matter was bound over to the Fourth District Court
for Utah County before Judge Cullen Y. Christensen for appearance
on November 15, 1991. (Exhibit 3).

On August 23, 1991 the State

of Utah, through its Adult Information and Parole Office, issued
a Pre-revocation Hearing and served it upon defendant, Sioudone
Phathmmavong.

On August 27, 1991, the defendant was returned to

the custody of the Utah State Prison at Draper, Utah. (Exhibit
4).

On September 19, 1991, defendant prepared a Notice and

Request for Disposition of Pending Charges and hand-delivered it
to Lynette Vance, a prison case worker.

This notice was received

by June Hinckley, an authorized agent of the DIO Record Unit of
the Utah State Prison on October 8, 1991. (Exhibit 5).

On or

about October 8, 1991, June Hinckley forwarded to the Utah County
Attorney's Office a Certificate of Inmate Status/120 Day
Disposition and the Notice and Request of Disposition of Pending
Charges.

These documents were sent by certified mail, and

received by the Utah Count Attorney's Office on October 11, 1991.
(Exhibits 6 & 7). On November 20, 1991, the Board of Pardons
denied review of the defendant's status until final disposition
of the pending charges of aggravated assault in the Fourth
District Court. (Exhibit 8).

On November 22, 1991, the defendant
3

was arraigned before Judge Cullen Y. Christensen, entered a plea
of not guilty, and trial was scheduled for December 11, 1991.
(Exhibit 9).
trial.

On December 11, 1991, the parties appeared for

The plaintiff indicated to the Court and to the defense

counsel that a new witness had just been discovered and was
present in court to testify.

Counsel for the defense moved to

continue the trial in order to interview the recently discovered
witness.

The Court continued the trial to January 6, 1992.

(Exhibit 10). The case came to trial January 6, 1992 with both
parties and a jury present.

Counsel for the plaintiff made a

Motion to Amend the Information to include a firearm enhancement
provision and to change the charge from a third degree to a
second degree felony.

Counsel for the defendant objected to the

motion of the State and the Court denied the Motion to Amend the
Information.

Thereafter, the State made a Motion to Dismiss the

Criminal Information of Aggravated Assault.
defendant objected to the Motion to Dismiss.

Counsel for the
The Court granted

the Motion to Dismiss. (Exhibit 11). On January 13, 1992, the
State prepared and filed a new information charging the defendant
with Count I: Aggravated Assault, with a Firearm Enhancement
Provision,a Second Degree felony and Count II: Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony.
(Exhibit 12). The defendant appeared on January 13, 1992 on the
new information and requested a preliminary examination.

The

preliminary examination was conducted on February 18, 1992, and
the matter bound over to the District Court on February 28, 1992
4

for arraignment before Judge Boyd L. Park. (Exhibit 13). On
February 28, 1992, the defendant appeared with counsel before
Judge Boyd L. Park and entered pleas of not guilty to the charges
and trial was scheduled for March 23, 1992. (Exhibit 14). The
defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the charges on March 4, 1992
asserting that the court had failed to dispose of his pending
charges within 120 days of his filing a Notice and a Request for
Disposition of Pending Charges pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
§77-29-1. (Exhibit 15).

The said motion was denied by

memorandum decision on March 17, 1992. (Exhibit 16). The
defendant was tried and convicted by a jury on March 23, 1992 of
aggravated assault, after which the State dropped the charge of
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. (Exhibit
17).

On May 29, 1992 a Notice of Appeal was filed. (Exhibit 18).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that the Trial Judge should have granted

his motion to dismiss to dismiss with prejudice both counts under
which he was convicted due to the State's failure to bring the
charges to trial within 120 days after Mr. Phathmmavong delivered
the Notice and Request of Disposition of the charges pending
against him, as required under Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1. The
120 time period should extend from the time that the defendant
handed his Request over to his prison caseworker.

Additionally,

the State's continual use of strategical manipulations should not
be rewarded by allowing them to waylay the statute's
requirements.

The last minute use of witnesses and alterations
5

in the charges indicate a tendency to circumvent the intended
purpose of the statute, which is to provide a speedy trial to
those who are incarcerated and have charges pending against them.
The attempt by the state to repress essentially identical charges
in order to overcome the statutory time limitation should not be
tolerated, and the charges should be dismissed with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DISPOSE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT WITHIN THE 120 DAYS REQUIRED UNDER UTAH
CODE ANN. §77-29-1.

The statutory language of §77-29-1 guarantees a prisoner the
right to have pending charges brought to trial within a 12 0 day
period after the delivery of a written demand.

There are several

factors that deserve focus on when determining the 120 day period
and the viability of the state to toll that time period that are
at issue in this case.
One factor influencing the length of time from notification
to the time of the trial itself involves the issue of when
delivery occurs.

One Utah Supreme Court case that dealt with the

issue of delivery to the warden or authorized representative was
State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975).

Taylor involved a

defendant who was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and
attempted theft.

He was incarcerated while the charges he was

eventually convicted on were pending.

He gave written notice

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-65-1(a),(b), a precursor to the
current §77-29-1, to an authorized agent of the warden.

The

notice was dated April 18, 1974, but the certified receipt which
6

the warden or his agent is required to complete was dated April
19.

The county attorney received the notice on April 22. The

trial was held on July 19, 1974. At that time defendant's
counsel moved to dismiss the charges because 92 days had passed
since the warden's agent had received the notice.

Id. at 311.

The trial court said that the 90 day computation (as required by
this older version of the statute) was determined from the date
the notice was delivered to the County Attorney and Court, not to
the warden.

Id. at 312.

On appeal the defendant claimed that the County Attorney and
Court had imputed notice through the warden.

While the Court did

find that the statute requires that the notice and a mandatory
certificate to be completed by the warden or his agent upon
receipt of the notice must be sent to the County Attorney and
Court, the warden or his agent are also required to act
"promptly" in forwarding both documents to the attorney and
Court.

Id. at 312. The Court stated that this particular

statute was a guideline to the time limits which "constitute a
speedy public trial, as guaranteed an accused in criminal
prosecutions under the constitution."

The Court then went on to

hold that "any attempt by the warden or his agents, to retain the
request, or to fail to complete the certificate, beyond a
reasonable time, or to misdirect the request would provide a
basis for judicial relief." Id. at 313.
In the instant case, the defendant delivered the complete
and adequate notice, as required by the statute, to his
7

caseworker, Ms. Lynette Vance, on September 19, 1991. That
notice was not received by the DIO agent, June Hinckley, until
October 8, 1991, a full 19 days after Mr. Phathmmavong had
delivered it.

The purpose in providing the time guidelines under

§77-29-1, like it predecessor in Taylor, is to guarantee the
right to a speedy trial, especially under the circumstances here.
In this case, the caseworker does represent, in all practical
applications, an agent of the warden.

The defendant here relied

upon this agent to deliver the document to the appropriate
authorities.

It is our stipulation that the retention of the

document from September 19 till October 8 was an unreasonable
time.

This Court has stipulated in Taylor that such actions will

"violate a prisoner's right to a speedy trial and would provide a
basis for judicial relief." Id. at 313.

The 19 days should

therefore be included in the time period used to figure the 120
day limit designated by the statute.
Regardless of the inclusion of the above discussed 19 day
period, the state exceeded the 120 day time limit.

Part 3 of the

statute allows the prosecution, the defense and court leeway for
a reasonable continuance based upon "good cause".

Several cases

have addressed the issue of good cause in this state.
The first case, and most current, is State v. Petersen, 810
P. 2d 421 (Utah 1991), as decided by the Utah Supreme Court.
Petersen was convicted of aggravated burglary, two counts of
attempted murder, and with being a habitual criminal.

On July 6,

1989 charges were brought, including possession of a firearm by a
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prohibited person, based upon a previous conviction.

On July 12

he was held in the Utah State Prison pending a parole revocation
hearing.

On that date he also filed a Notice and Request for

Disposition Pending Charges with an authorized agent of the Utah
State Prison, as required by Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1. The
County attorney received the copy but the court did not.

On July

27 the public defender was appointed as defense counsel.
Arraignment was on September 6, at which time the defendant
requested a new attorney due to dissatisfaction.

The request was

denied and, without objection, the trial was set for February 15,
1990, over 218 days after defendant filed the notice.

On

January 5, 1990, Peterson's counsel sought to withdraw due to
conflict.

On January 12, the trial court denied the motion and

appointed co-counsel.

The new counsel filed a motion to dismiss

based on a lapse of the 120 day time period.

On February 15,

1990 a hearing on the motion was held and the motion to dismiss
was denied.

Id. at 422.

The trial court based dismissal on the fact that (1) the
County Attorney had received the Notice of Disposition, but the
Court had received no notice.

(2) The Court asked Petersen

whether the trial date was acceptable, and Petersen did not
object to the date.

(3) The trial date was set to allow time for

the defendant and his counsel to resolve their differences. Id.
at 422. The Court ruled in its conclusions at law that the trial
date set on February 15 was within the 120 day period and was for
good cause as it allowed Petersen and his counsel time to resolve
9

their differences.

The Court also stated that the defendant

waived the right to the 120 day limit by not objecting to the
date of the trial.

The Court then determined that it was

Petersen's duty to show that the failure to try the case within
the statutory time period resulted in prejudice to him or
tactical advantage to the prosecutor.

The Court found that

Petersen could not show either factor and that the delay was not
caused by the prosecutor.

Id. at 423.

Petersen was convicted thereafter in a jury trial of the
murder and burglary charges and waived the right to a jury trial
on the habitual criminal charges.

The Court found him guilty on

the latter charge and the prosecution dropped the unauthorized
possession of a handgun charge.

Id. at 423.

The main question before the Supreme Court was whether or
not Petersen had waived his rights by not objecting to the trial
date.

Id. at 423.

The Court determined that it was a question

of statutory construction and could therefore be reviewed for its
correctness.

The Court then went on to say that the burden to

bring the case within the statutory period rested with the
prosecutor.

Petersen then was not required to object to the

trial date to preserve his rights under the statute.

Id. at 424.

The Court held that a showing of "good cause" was to be
applied in both §77-29-1 (3) and (4). IcL_ at 425. But the trial
court erred in finding that Petersen's inability to show
prejudice to himself or tactical advantage to the prosecutor was
good cause.

The statute states that if there is not "good cause"
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for delay the court order will be dismissed.

Id. at 425. The

Court held that because neither attorney or defendant requested a
continuance, the requirement of the statute was not met as it
requires that "the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his
counsel may be granted reasonable continuances". Id. at 425.
The Court also found that the delay was not reasonably based
on the allotment of time for defendant and counsel to resolve
their differences.

In this case the trial court became aware of

the problem 57 days after the notice was filed.

There was plenty

of time to resolve the problems, but the trial court did not feel
a delay was necessary.

Id. at 426.

the trial court's good cause was not.
and dismissed with prejudice.

The Supreme Court held that
The charges were reversed,

Id. at 428.

In the case at hand, the defendant, Mr. Phathmmavong,
prepared the Request for Disposition on September 19, 1991 and it
was delivered to the Utah County Attorney's Office on October 11,
1991.

The trial was originally scheduled for December 11, 1991,

61 days after receipt of the Request by the County Attorney's
Office.

On December 11, both counsel for the defense requested

a continuance to "depose a new witness" which the prosecution had
only discovered, but who was present in court to testify.

The

court then continued the trial until January 6, 1992, 87 days
after the Request was properly received.

On January 6 when the

case was called to trial, the County Attorney made a motion to
amend the information to include a firearm enhancement and to
change the charge to a second degree felony.
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Objection by the

defense counsel was sustained and the motion was denied.
State then made a Motion to Dismiss the Information.

The

Defense

counsel again objected on the grounds that it was untimely.

The

matter had been set for trial twice and the defendant was being
held in Utah State Prison due to the charges.

Counsel

stipulated that the defendant's right to a speedy trial would be
denied if the case was continued.
motion.

The Court however granted the

New charges were filed by the state with the previously

proposed enhancements on January 13, 1992, 94 days after receipt
by the County Attorney of the Request for Disposition.

Arraign-

ment and the requested preliminary hearing were set for February
18, 1992, 125 days after receipt of the Request.

The matter was

then bound over to the District Court for February 28, 135 days
after the Request for Disposition was received.

Trial was set

for March 23, 1992, 159 days after receipt by the County Attorney
of the Request for Disposition.
On January 6th, neither the defendant nor his counsel made a
request for continuance.

The defendant, in fact, objected to the

dismissal of charges due to the very fact that a continuance of
this sort would deny him the right to a speedy trial.

The delay

caused by the granting of the dismissal and the refiling of the
charges with the enhanced penalties does not constitute the good
cause as discussed in Petersen.

The State had been aware from

the beginning of the investigation in June of 1991 that a firearm
was a key instrument in the crime.

The wounds sustained by the

victim and witness testimony all refer to the use of a firearm.
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The state then should have included these provisions from the
beginning.

The possession of a firearm by a restricted person

charge should also have been brought from the very beginning.
The dismissal and refiling of the same charge with weapons
enhancements, along with the separate possession by a restricted
person count are not good cause reasons to extend to time period.
The lack of inclusion by the prosecutor of the enhanced charges
should not and cannot be allowed to qualify as "good cause" in
this situation.
In State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158 (1969) the
Supreme Court dealt with some principals underlying the intent of
the legislature in passing Utah Code Annotated §77-65-1, the
predecessor to the section under discussion in this case. Wilson
was serving a sentence for robbery.

While incarcerated, a

complaint was filed charging him with forgery.

On February 27,

1967 he filed a Request for Final Disposition of the forgery
charge with an authorized agent.

On April 10, 19 67 he was bound

over for district court and trial was set for June 6, 1967.
Defendant made no comment as to the time period and no
objections.

At the trial, defendant moved to dismiss based on

the lapse of the 90 day period according to the statute.
362, 159.

Id. at

The Court in addressing the issue emphasized that the

continuance or time period between the Request for Final
Disposition and the trial must be based on good cause.
362, 159.

Id. at

The Court then went on to explore the reasoning

behind the passage of the statute.
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It stated that its intent was

to provide a speedy trial.

The Court then said "It is apparent

that the intent of the legislature was to prevent those charged
with enforcement of criminal statutes from holding over the head
of a prisoner undisposed of charges against him." Id. at 363,159.
The very purpose of the legislature in adopting the statute
as indicated by Wilson would be destroyed if the State's refiling
of the charges is accepted by the court.

The State would in

effect, be able to hold the additional charge of "possession of a
firearm by a restricted person" over the heads of many prisoners.
This would be in direct conflict with the Court's determination
of the statutory intent.
The possession by a restricted person charge is dependent
upon and a part of the original charges.

At the trial itself,

the charge was not addressed until after the first charge of
aggravated assault had been tried.

If the State is allowed to

extend the time limit by adding such parasitic charges, the
purpose of this statute in providing a speedy trial, as was
discussed in Petersen and Wilson, would be circumvented and the
statute would be a hollow shell of the legislature's intent.
Even disregarding the time period that the caseworker held
the Request and the time period the trial was delayed so that the
defense could interview the prosecution's last minute witness,
there was still a time period of 133 days that lapsed before this
case came to trial.

This lapse and the lack of good cause on the

part of the prosecutor in allowing this delay should result in
the dismissal of charges with prejudice.
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II. THE PRIMARY DELAYS IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE WERE A
RESULT OF THE MANEUVERS OF PROCEDURE EXERCISED BY THE
STATE.
The primary delay in this case was caused by the dismissal
of the first complaint and the subsequent recharging of the same
complaint with the firearm enhancement provision and the separate
but co-dependent count of possession by a restricted person.

The

Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of charging of complaints
that were identical to those previously dismissed by the State
in State v. Moore, 521 P.2d 556 (Utah 1974).
In Moore, the defendant was convicted of selling controlled
substances.

On September 17, 1977 two complaints were filed in

the trial court against the defendant for selling marijuana and
heroin.

A preliminary trial was set for November 26, 1971, but

the prosecution was not ready at that time.
granted.

A continuance was

On that day the defendant was taken into custody in

violation of parole and returned to the Utah State Prison on
December 2.

On December 30, the defendant delivered the Request

for Final Disposition to the authorized person.

A preliminary

examination was held on February 8, 1972, but again the
prosecution was not ready.

The State moved for another

continuance but the Court ordered the counts dismissed for
failure of the State to prosecute.

On February 9, 1972, new

complaints, identical to the previously dismissed charges were
made.

At a preliminary hearing in the City Court on March 8 the

defendant renewed the Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
On April 12th, the defendant was found guilty.
15

The defendant

appealed the conviction on the basis that there was no good cause
for the delay in his trial, as both sets of charges were
identical.

The Court looked to §77-65-1 (a) of the previous

version of the code.

Id. at 557.

The Court determined that "the

procedure of dismissing a complaint or an information and
thereafter filing a complaint or an information charging an
identical offense cannot be used by a prosecutor to avoid a
mandate of the statute as was done here." Id. at 558.
In the case in question, the state used similar tactics to
achieve their goal and to overcome a deficiency in their case.
As was discussed previously, the State wanted to dismiss the
charges because it had neglected to previously include the
firearms enhancement and the possession count.

The State knew of

the information in the investigation that led to these eventual
additions from the beginning of the case.

They had ample time to

have amended or even dismissed the charges at an earlier date.
However, the State chose to dismiss these charges with only a
little over 30 days left in the time period, and the trial itself
was not rescheduled until a considerable time after the 120 day
limit.

The tactics used here in delaying the trial in order to

circumvent the statute are precisely those the Court warned about
in Moore.
A case that further delineates the rule set in Moore, is
State v. Farnsworth, 519 P.2d 244 (Utah 1974).

The defendant in

that case was convicted of Burglary in the 2nd degree and Grand
Larceny.

His appeal was based on a denial of a speedy trial.
16

The facts of the case are that on June 19, 1972 a complaint was
filed for the burglary of Strebel's Taxidermist.

Officers went

to his home and conducted a search and found white powder in a
bag.

He was then charged with possession of a controlled

substance.

The next day the Utah State Board of Pardons issued a

warrant for violation of parole.

Several days later the drug

charges were dropped, but the defendant was not released.
Another complaint was filed for burglarizing the Adult Probation
and Parole Department Office in Ogden.

On June 27, the defendant

filed a written request for Disposition of all charges within 90
days, as required then under Utah Code Annotated §77-65-1.

The

charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence but on October
12, the same day as the dismissal, the State filed a complaint on
the burglary charges of the Ben Lomand Animal Hospital.
Defendant was brought to trial on December 13, 1972 where he was
found guilty.

On appeal the defendant argued that any accusation

against him whether charged or not must be disposed of within the
90 day period.

The Court said that the Request for Disposition

did not apply to unfiled charges.
The defendant's case here can be distinguished from
Farnsworth.

The counts discussed in Farnsworth all involved acts

that were distinctly separate.

The charges that the defendant in

that case tried to include under the Request for Disposition had
no relation other than the fact that the state brought the
charges during approximately the same period.

In Mr.

Phathammavong's case, the charges brought by the State were so
17

similar as to be considered identical.

The amendments requested

by the State on January 6, while changing the degree of the
charge, and therefore altering the punishment were all based upon
the exact same incident and the same base charge, that of
aggravated

assault.

The only real differentiation between the

two charges was the time period involved in the sentencing and
they were not sustainable by the Prosecution as distinctive
counts.
While the introduction of a witness at the last minute may
not necessarily be a maneuver by the State to delay the trial,
when considering the totality of the effect of the State's
manipulations regarding the time period in this case, the Court
could find that the introduction of the last minute witness at
the first trial date was such an attempt, especially since the
witness was ready for trial that very day, while the defense had
no notification of the witness prior to the scheduled trial time.
III. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENSE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS BOTH COUNTS I AND II.
While the trial court denied the State's Motion to amend the
original charges, it essentially allowed the same effect to occur
by permitting the state to dismiss the original charges and to
refile the same charges with the desired amendments.

As was

discussed in the above section, however, because the counts are
essentially identical and therefore good cause for the lapse of
the statutory period cannot be justified, the trial court should
have dismissed the charges with prejudice.

The fact that the

second count in the trial was not included in the first
18

indictment should not dissuade the court from dismissing the
charges as the second count was so involved with the first count
as to be virtually inseparable.

The court should have therefore,

for these and the reasons already stated have dismissed both
counts with prejudice for having exceeded the statutory period
found in §77-29-1.
While in determining the statutory period the court should
include the time period that ran due to the caseworker's
unwarranted holding of the Notice filed by the defendant on
September 18, as well as the time period that was reguired for
the defense to interview the last minute witness in the
determination of the 120 day time period, even if when these time
periods are tolled, the remaining time that passed from the
filing to the trial exceeded the 120 day period by over ten days.
Considering the fact that the Prosecutor could have easily stayed
within the time period allotted by the statute if the information
had been processed correctly, the lapse of the time period cannot
reasonably be expected to be extended for good cause.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying the Motion to Dismiss due
to the failure of the State to bring the charges to trial within
the statutory 120 limit.

The time period ran from, at the

earliest, September 19 thru March 23. While the Court may
disagree as to whether or not the continuance to interview the
witness and the time period during which the caseworker kept the
Notice and Request, the time period still exceeded the 120 limit
19

when the case was finally brought to trial on March 23, 1992. The
fact that the counts had been dropped and recharged later should
have no tolling effect on the time period.
Dated this

— ^

day of February, 1993.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Hailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this
February, 1993.
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ADDENDUM
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (1953, as amended)
§77-29-1.

Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending chargeDuties of custodial officer-Continuance may be grantedDismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial.

(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in
the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional
institution of this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information,
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of
the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge
and court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of
written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff, or custodial officer, upon receipt
of the demand described in subsection (1), shall immediately
cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate
prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff, or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting
attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such
information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding
prisoner as shall be requested.
(3)
After written demand is delivered as required in
subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or
his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within
120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and
the defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the
court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney is not supported by
good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made
or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3-(2)(f) (1953, as amended).
§78-2a-3-(2)(f). Court of Appeals Jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:
(f) appeals form a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of
first degree or capital felony;
A-l

A-z
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 27

Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs.
(a) Time for serving and filing briefs. The appellant shall serve and file
a brief within 40 days after date of notice from the clerk of the appellate court
pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposition has been previously interposed pursuant to Rule 10, in which event service and filing shall
be within 30 days from the denial of such motion. The appellee shall serve and
file a brief within 30 days after service of the appellant's brief. A reply brief
may be served and filed by the appellant within 30 days after the filing and
service of the appellee's brief, but, except for good cause shown, a reply brief
must be served and filed at least 10 days before argument. By stipulation filed
with the court, the parties may extend each of such periods for no more than
30 days in civil cases or 15 days in criminal cases. No such stipulation shall be
effective unless it is filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be
extended.
(b) Number of copies to be filed and served. Ten copies of each brief,
one of which shall contain an original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk
of the Supreme Court. Eight copies of each brief, one of which shall contain an
original signature, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals. Four
copies shall be served on counsel for each party separately represented.
(c) Consequence of failure to file briefs. If an appellant fails to file a
brief within the time provided in this rule, or within the time as may be
extended by order of the appellate court, an appellee may move for dismissal
of the appeal. If an appellee fails to file a brief within the time provided by
this rule, or within the time as may be extended by order of the appellate
court, an appellant may move that the appellee not be heard at oral argument.
(d) Return of record to the clerk. Each party, upon the filing of its brief,
shall return the record to the clerk of the court having custody pursuant to
these rules.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
5 Am. Jur 2d Appeal and
Error § 688.
C.J.S. - 5 C J . S Appeal and Error §§ 1337
to 1342.

A.L.R. — Consequences of prosecution's failure to file timely brief in appeal by accused, 27
A.L R 4th 213
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 765

Rule 27. Form of briefs.
(a) Paper size; printing and spacing. Briefs shall be typewritten, printed
or prepared by photocopying or other duplicating or copying process that will
produce clear, black and permanent copies equally legible to printing, in type
not smaller than ten characters per inch, on opaque, unglazed white paper 8V2
inches wide and 11 inches long, and shall be securely bound along the left
margin. The impression must be double spaced, except for matter customarily
single spaced and indented, with adequate margins on the top and sides of
each page.
(b) Binding. Briefs shall be printed on both sides of the page, and bound
with a compact-type binding so as not unduly to increase the thickness of the
brief along the bound side. Coiled plastic and spiral-type bindings are not
acceptable.
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KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

INFORMATION

vs.
SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG
A d d r e s s Unknown
DOB:

C r i m i n a l No.

qnccin?

8-16-70
Defendant(s)

KAY BRYSON, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah,accuses the defendant(s)"
of the following crime(s):
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 76-5103, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he, on or
about June 15, 1991, in Utah County, Utah, did attempt with
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another by
using such means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
Information is based on evidence sworn to by: Mike Larsen, Orem
PD
Authorized for prosecution by:
C0MPLM7I/WT

>&^j£*

^A^A^

UTAH C O U l O Y A T r D R f l E Y ^ ^ ^ ^

Subscribed _a|id sworn to* before
me this / <L_day of \J~iJ 1991
/
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A-A(c)

FOURTH CIRCUIT, COURT JV STATE OF .UTAH
UTAH COUNTY .^OREM DEPARTMENT,'

25.;«
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

vs

SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG
c/o JIMI MITSUNAGA, Attorney
731 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
DOB:

08-16-70

BINDOVER ORDER
Case No. 911001115 FS

Male
Defendant)

INFORMATION FILED ON
FIRST APPEARANCE HEARING HELD ON
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION HELD ON

July,12, 1901
August 5,f1991
October 21; 1991

Appearing for the State of Utah:
Sherry Ragan
l
Appearing for the Defendant:.
dSSBiH46*^fmxana&
BIND-OVER ORDER
DEFENDANT'S NAME: Sioudohe Phathammavong
C R I M E CHARGED: Aggravated Assault', a Third Degree Felony
a the evidence presented^at«<the- preliminary examination the
•.gned magistrate £4.nds .probables cause t6<Fb,elieve that the
Ci..
charged has been committed andIthat;,fchefdefendantcommitted
the same. It is ORDERED,, thatithe defendant, b^bound over to answer
said charge in the Four5hfDis£rict Court iin.anfi.for Utah County,
State of Utah before Judge CULLIN CHRJSTENSEN$dn;No
November 15, 1991
at the hour of 2:30 P.M. in his courtroom 4 3 62'(2*

DATED:

October 25,v1991
Circuit Court Judge

transmitted to the Clerk of-the District Court October 25> 1991 by
the undersigned.

Deputy Clerk

EXKSMiS?^

A-S

STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PRORATION AND PAROLE
PREREVDCATION HEARING INFORMATION

Tn the Matter of: SIOUDONE PHAT1WMAVON3
OBSCTS 9:

00052118

USP //: 19643

The State of Utah, Adult Probation and Parole, accuses SIOUDONE PHATTIAMMAVONG
of violation of his parole in the following particulars, to-wit:
1. By having committed the offense of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree
Felony, on or about the 15th day of June, 1991 in Utah County, State
of Utah, in violation of condition number three of the Parole
Agreement,
and charges that the same SIOUDONE PHATHA^VONG was paroled from the Utah
State Prison on the ?6th day of March, 1991, and the above conduct is in
violation of his parole.

All accused parole violators have the right to respond to the allegations made
against them, to have voluntary witnesses appear on their behalf, present
relevant evidence by affidavit or by other means and the right to question
persons having information on which the alleged parole violations are based.
However, if the hearing officer determines that the witness would be subject
to risk or harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to
confrontation and cross -examination.

DATTP this ?2rd day of August, 1991.

A

j r i l L. y . Rflwie

DistrictsAgent

EXHIBIT 4
A-6

hL.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION
OF PENDING CHARGE(S)
TO:

0 , LANE McCOTTER, DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS

N o t i c e i s hereby g i v e n t h a t I , ^ ( Q Q ^ A ^ 9haVWvvx<v\as/(ma
do
hereby r e q u e s t f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f any charge (s) now pendirrg
a g a i n s t me i n any c o u r t i n the S t a t e o f . U t a h , Charge(s) a r e now
pending a g a i n s t me in t h e c o u r t ( s ) of thstt^V l o o r * oC Ofru.U COO»VK/
c o u n t y and r e q u e s t i s hereby made t h a t you forward t h i s n o t i c e uo
the a p p r o p r i a t e a u t h o r i t i e s in t h a t county t o g e t h e r with such
i n f o r m a t i o n a s required by l a w .
Assault, 3rd Degree

Dated this

/?^

day of

^xp+mktr

199 J_

- ~^~*/r^^l4r
InSate^Name

LELk!£l
~^

USP #

I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I have r e c e i v e d a copy of the f o r e g o i n g
notice this
^ ^ day of
(1)sJrh<^>
199 /

</tj>c^
y^V
f

EXHIBIT 5
A-7

^z^Jy^yf
AUTHORIZE^ AGENT
DIO RECORD UNIT
UTAH STATE PRISON
P.O. BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH 84020

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS / 120-DAY DISPOSITION

Utah

TO:
RE:

County Attorney

Sioudone PhathammavonR

Inmate's Name

TERM OF COMMITMENT:

1 to 15, 1 to 15 CC

TIME SERVED:

2 yrs.

TIME REMAINING:
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY:

19643
USP #

13 Yrs.
Returned 8/27/91 on Parole Violation.
new parole date as of t h i s date.

Has nni- received

BOARD OF PARDONS
DECISION:

0 . LANE McCOTTER
DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTIONAL

y

AUTHORIZED
:ED JA(

DIO RECORD UNIT
UTAH STATE PRISON
P.O. BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH 84020

cc:

County Clerk
File
EXHIBIT 6
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OPERATIONS

SENDER: Complete items 1 and 2 when additional services art deuted. and compieta it ems
3 and 4.
Put yout address in the "RETURN TO" Space on the reverse side. Failure to do this will prevent this card
from be«ng returned to you. The return recetpt fee will provide you the name of the person delivered to and
the dote of delivery For additional fees the following services are available. Consult postmaster for feet
and check boxteslfor additional service<s> requested.'
1. C Show to whom delivered, date, and addressee's address.
2. D Restricted Delivery
(Extra charge)
(Extra charge)

©

4. Article Number

3. Article Addressed to:

P-??6 544 148
Type of Service:
LJ Registered
Certified
LJ Express Mail

Utah County Attorney
100 East Center
Provo, Utah
84606

LJ Insured

• COO
f""| Return Receipt
for Merchandise

Always obtain signature of addressee
0/ agent and OATE 0EL1VERSD.

8. Addressee's Address (ONLY if
requested and fee paid)

5. Signature — Addressee

X
6. Signature - / y \ g e n t

x

L

7. Date of Delivery

PS Form 3 8 1 1/Apr./1989

• u-S.G-P.o. m»-23s-«is

DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print your name, address and ZIP C o o s J ^ ^ S 9 ^
k\ the speca below.
••)•*.
—
• Compieta items 1. 2. 3. and 4 on the
reverse.
• Attach to front of article rf space
permits, otherwise affix to back of
article.
• Endorse article "Return Receipt
Requested" adjacent to number.
RETURN
TO

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE
USE. 1300

Print Sender's name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below.

June Hinckley, Records & I.D Officer
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah

Re: S»RiathanrTiavone
19643

EXHIBIT 7

84020

< v—<y
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

H.L. (Pete) Haun

State of Utah
BOARD OF PARDONS
448 East 6400 South - Suite 300
Murray. Utah 84107
(801)261-6464

Chairman

Donald E. BUnchard
Michael R. Sibbett
William L. Peter*
Heather N. Cooke

November 1, 1991

Members

Sioudone Phathammavon, USP# 19643
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

Dear Mr, Sioudone:
You are scheduled to appear before the Board of Pardons in the matter of a Parole
Violation Hearing on November 20, 1991, at 3:00 pm.
Prior to your appearance before the Board, a Parole Office representative will ser
you with a copy of the charges against you, and will explain your rights at the
hearing. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. The law firm of Yengil
Rich, Xaiz and Metos will provide legal service for this hearing to you free of charge
A representative will contact you prior to your scheduled hearing date. However, if y
wish to have your own attorney represent you, you will need to submit your request to
in writing and have them contact our office rigiit away.
Family members, friends and other visitors are allowed to attend the hearing, but
are not allowed to speak.
^
Through a change in the law, if your victim(s) request it, they will be allowed tc
speak at your hearing. They may also request that you leave the room while this
testimony is being presented. If so, you will be given the opportunity to listen to <
tape recording of that testimony before the hearing continues.
In connection with your upcoming hearing, everything in your Board file may be
considered. Like other offenders' files, your file contains its own variation of the'
following categories of information:
(1) Public information, including judgment and commitment orders, prior Board
dispositions, parole agreements, and the like;
(2) Information generated from Adult Probation and Parole, including presentence
and postsentence reports, probation violation reports, parole progress and violation
reports, diagnostic reports, and so forth;
(3) Prison information, including board reports, disciplinaries, progress and
rescission reports, psychologicals, etc.;
(A) Information generated internally for the Board, including worksheets, routin
guideline matrices, alienist reports, warrant requests;
(5) Other criminal justice information, including police and prosecutorial repor
recommendations from sentencing judges, criminal record data, other court documents;
(6) Other correspondence sent to the Board ronrernjng you.
Any other specific items of information to l>^ m u s i «lered by the Board will be
identified for you at the hearing and you will li^ve an opportunity to respond at that
time.
Sincerely, -

-^

KARAN D. PACE
Hearing Officer
~. —, .

tion

EXHIBIT8

NOV, 2 6 1991
IN THE .FOURTH*JUDICIAL DISTRICT,,COURT
UTAH ^ COUNTY,'? STATE OF - UTAH •
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:

911400516

vs.

DATE: November 22, 1991

SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG

CULLEN Yi CHRISTENSEN, JU

Defendant.

Reptj

E.V.Quist, CSR

ARRAIGNMENT-TRIAL DATE SCHEDULED
This was the timefset for arraignment on a charge of
Aggravated Assault, a 3rd Degree Felony.

Claudia Laycock, Depu

County Attorney,' appearedCon*behalfVof the'State of Utah-

The <

was present in CourtJand"was ,'represented by Donald Elkins, who
appeared in place of Jimi'Mitsunagaj' counsel • of record.
The defendnat waived-.the* reading of the Information,
having been furnished with aHcopy in;Circuit Court.
To thercharge contained. in*the Information, the def
entered a plea of^Not Guilty*
The Court'set.,the .matter?for trial on Wednesday,
fDecember^l^9^

^ Request for jury

instructions to}be < submitted /to/theJ^Court by December 4 th, L991,
A copy-of this"minute?entryjmailed to counsel.

cc: Utah County Attorney
Jimi Mitsunaga,'Esq.
Donald Elkins,,Esq. -

^^TRTTT^

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

^

Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:

911400516

vs.

DATE: December 11, 1991

SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG

CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

Defendant.

Rept:

E.V.Quist, CSR

TRIAL RESCHEDULED
This was the time set for trial in the above captioned
matter with Sherry Ragan, Deputy County Attorney, appearing on
behalf of the State of Utah.

The defendant was present in Court

along with counsel Jimi Mitsunaga.
For the record the def previously entered a plea of Not
Guilty to a charge of aggravated assault, a 3rd Degree Felony and
matter was scheduled for todays jury trial.
The following jurors were called to appear for
qualifications in todays hearing:
Norma J. Anderson, Faye S. Belliston, Harold W. Balck,
Richard Colborn, Jeanne Crews, Tex Gifford, Ronald Dean Halls,
Brad Huish, Tim Kuchar, Richard J. mcClendon, Jessie McQuivey,
Michael J. Newson, Dane jay Parker, LaVerne pennock, Judith A.
Rasband, Wilma Riddle, Deborah Rodabough, Dean Shimmin, Kaye
L.W.Smith, Jerry J. Stubbs, Gary W. Thompson, Jerry L. Walker,
Toni Kaye Wall, DRichard C. Worthen, Tina Renee Young and Slade
L»? \ r> 7, <\ V) u i s

K

is.

At this time a conference was held in chambers.
counsel present.

Both

Mr. Mitsunaga addressed the Court and indicated that two
of the witnesses that both the State and Defense have been looking
for have now surfaced.

Counsel requested a continuance of the

trial as to allow time for both counsel to depos these witnesses.
EXHIBIT 10

The State has no objections to a continuance.

Matter

discussed.
The Court reconvened.

Counsel, defendant and

prospective jurors present.
The Court addressed the jury panel and informed them
that todays trial is vacated on stipulation of counsel and their
services will not be needed today.

The panel was thanked and

excused from the Court room.
The Court rescheduled the trial for Monday, January 6th
1992 at 9:00 a.m. with a Jury.

Any further amendments to be

filed by next Monday, December 16th, 1991.

For the record the

Court notes that there is also another criminal trial set for tha
same day which another Judge may have to hear.
Ms Ragan addressed the Court and requested Court
admonish the defs family not to contact or harrass the victim or
witnesses in this matter.
The Court cautioned defense counsel to advise the defs
family not to interfer or contact any of the potential witnesses.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Utah
County Sheriff.
A copy of this minute entry mailed to counsel.

cc:

Utah County Attorney
Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

\,

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

%,
%,

'

'<£

/*

THE STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NUMBER:

Plaintiff,

911400516

vs.

DATE: January 6, 1992

SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG

CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

Defendant,

Rept:

E.V.Quist, CSR

INFORMATION DISMISSED
This was the time set for trial in the above captioned
matter with Sherry Ragan, Deputy County Attorney, appearing on
behalf of the State of UTah.

The def was present in Court along

with counsel Jimi Mitsunaga.
The defendant has been charged with the crime of
Aggravated Assault, a 3rd Degree Felony, to which def entered a
plea of Not Guilty and matter was set for trial.
The following prospective jurors were called to appear
and be qualified for this 1st 1992 term of Court:
Gary Bascom, Chris Blackhurst, LaReta Brinkeroff, Melani
Burningham, Noel N. Cardon, C. Floyd David, Steve R. Evon, Verlene
Gagon, Stephanie Hathaway, John L. Jensen, Sonya M. LeBaron,
Daniel Ray Maxwell, Lorena Olsen, Vaughn Pack, Garth Lynn Roundy,
John Simmons, Eva Bell Smith, Laur Jean Stacy, Marilyn D. Steele,
Paul B. Stott, Stanley LeLand Taylor, Richard Garth Wilkinson,
Mark Woofinden, and Phillip Young.
At this time counsel met with the Court in chambers
outside the hearing of the prospective jurors.
reported.

EXHIBIT 11

Matter was

At this time Ms Ragan made a Motion to amend the
Information and include the firearm enhancement making the charge
a 2nd Degree Felony.
Mr. Mitsunaga objected and argued same.
The Court denied the motion to Amend the Information.
The State made a Motion to Dismiss with the
understanding the State will refile the charge under the
enhancement statute.
Mr. Mitsunaga objected as motion being untimely and the
fact that this is the 2nd time this matter has been set for
trial.

The def is being held in the Utah State Prison and one of

the reasons for the parole violation was this case.

By d^f not:

being allowed to proceed at this time denies defs right to a
speedy trial.
The Court finds there is no information to prevent the
State from pursuing the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion to
Dismiss is therefore granted.

To the extent def is being held in

custody in this case, he may now be released, subject to being
held on other matters other than this particular case.
10:30 a.m.

Court reconvened.

Counsel, Defendant and

all prospective jurors present in Court.
The Court addressed the jury panel and explained that
other arrangements have been made in this matter and there
services will be be required for today but this is a new panel and
needs to be qualified for the 1st 1992 term of Court.
The clerk gave the prospective jurors the oath.
Statutory questions asked by the Court.
The Court finds the above jurors are qualified to serve
in this term of Court.

The jurors were thanked and excused form

further duty today.
Court in recess

A-13(b)
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KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

INFORMATION

vs.
SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG
Utah State Prison
DOB:

Criminal No.

8-16-70

Defendant(s)

9 2/-0O

KAY BRYSON, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah,accuses the defendants)
of the following crime(s):
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, in violaiton of 76-5103 & 76-3-203(3)(Firearm Enhancement), Utah Code Annotated, 1954
as amended, in that he, on or about June 14, 1991, in Utah
County, Utah, did knowingly and intentionally assault Tommy
Martinez and cause severe bodily injury to Tommy Martinez and/or
did knowingly and intentionally assault Tommy Martinez by use of
a deadly weapon, to:wit a firearm.
Notice: If the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or
the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the court may additionally sentence
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
COUNT II: POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED
PERSON, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 76-10-503, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that he, on or about June 14,
1991, in Utah County, Utah, a person who is on parole or
probation for a felony, had in is possession or under his custody
or control a dangerous weapon, namely, a firearm.

EXHIBIT 12

I n f o r m a t i o n i s based on e v i d e n c e sworn t o by: Mike L a r s e n , Orem
PD
Authorized

for

prosecution

by:
COJJPLA INANT

UTAH COUWY ATTORNEY

xT^Z-

S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o
me t h i s
}^
day of J_9

9

before
199^

^&Zfy0Wf

DEPU

1-6-92

1
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FOuivTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF uTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT
CTi-.' :K ' ( ZG'URT
AH

)

STATE OF UTAH

iMVOOOg&ft

Plaintiff,
vs

g

57 4/f '32
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BINDOVER ORDER
U
Case No. 921-60 FS *kfC

SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG
c/o Gary Weight
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box M L"
Provo, Utah 84603
Defendant.
INFORMATION FILED ON
FIRST APPEARANCE HEARING HELD ON
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION HELD ON

January 13, 1992
January 13, 1992
February 18, 1992

Appearing for the State of Utah:
Appearing for the Defendant:

Sherry Ragan
Gary Weight

BIND-OVER ORDER
DEFENDANT'S NAME: SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG
CRIME CHARGED: Count I - Aggravated Assault - 3rd Degree;
Count II - Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person 3rd Degree.4d
From the evidence presented at the preliminary examination the
undersigned magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed and that the defendant committed
the same. It is ORDERED that the defendant be bound over to answer
said charge in the Fourth District Court in and for Ut<
State of Utah before JUDGE BOYD L. PARK on February^^f^S^Sfset the
hour of 9:00 A.M. in his courtroom # 402 4
DATED:

February 18, 1992

sC"&

This order and all pleadings in and records made of trftO^asMffereeaing
in this case (except tape number 92-1-67 which have been retained
subject to order of the District Court) tramsmitted to the Clerk o
the District Court February 19, 1992, by the undersigned.

Deputy Clerk
EXHIBIT 13
A-15
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
. CARMAB. SMITH Clerk

cg-^y^^j^-

DepUty

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

CASE NUMBER:

THE STATE OF UTAH,

921400082

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,
-vs-

DATE:

February 28, 1992

SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG,

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
Rpt. by Richard C. Tatton, CSR

Defendant.

Clerk:

Laurie Hinton

**********

ARRAIGNMENT/JURY TRIAL SET
This matter came before the Court for arraignment of
the above-named defendant on a charge of Ct. I - Aggravated
Assault, a 3rd degree felony and Ct. II - Possession Of A
Dangerous Weapon By A Restricted Person, a 3rd degree felony.
Deputy Utah County Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for and on
behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was present and
represented by Gary Weight.
The defendant waived the reading of Information and to
the charges contained therein, entered a plea of Not Guilty.
The defendant then waived his right to a speedy trial.
The Court then set this matter for a jury trial on the
23rd day of March, 1992 at the hour of 9:00 a.m.. Counsel are
required to meet with the Court in chambers at 8:30 a.m. the
date of the trial.
Counsel are directed to submit Jury Instruction and
any Special Voir Dire to the Court no later than five business
days prior to the trial date.

EXHIBIT 14
A-16
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The defendant addressed the Court with a motion for a
bill of particulars and a motion to bifurcate. Mr. Weight
informed the Court that he will review the defendant's motions
and file them if appropriate.

cc:

Utah County Attorney
Gary Weight
Adult Probation and Parole

COPY

GARY H. WEIGHT, (3415)
ALDRICH# NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorney for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.

:

MOTION TO DISMISS

:

SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG,
Defendant-

:

Case No. 921400082

:

(Judge Boyd Park)

COMES NOW the defendant SIOUDONE PHATHMMAVONG by and through
counsel Gary H. Weight, Esq., and moves the Court to enter an Order
of Dismissal with prejudice of the criminal charges pending against
the defendant in the above captioned case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On July 12, 1991, the State of Utah filed an information

charging the defendant with aggravated assault.

See a copy of the

information attached hereto marked Exhibit "1" and made a part
hereof by this reference.
2.

The information issued by the County Attorney's Office was

based upon an investigation by Orem Police Officers who discovered
1
EXHIBIT 15

information charging an identical offense cannot be used
by a prosecutor to avoid a mandate of the statute as was
done in this case.
The Supreme Court reversed the verdicts and judgments of the trial
court.
In this case the dismissal of the aggravated assault and
refiling of an aggravated assault with weapons enhancement does not
extend the 120 day disposition nor affect the commencement of the
120 day period. The addition of a separate count of possession by
a restricted person does not restart the 120 day disposition.
It is the contention of the defendant PHATHMMAVONG, that the
record is devoid of any evidence supporting "good cause" for
continuing the trial of this case beyond the 120 days set by the
statute.

Defendant further contends that all charges against him

should be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED and SIGNED this

^i£- d a y

of

March, 1992.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, pcstage prepaid, a copy of the
foregoing instrument to, Sherry Regan, 100 East Center, Suite 2100,
Provo, Utah 84606, this H r V day of W&VzlA,
1992.

4- YM \lj{i\Jfu
15
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RECEIVED MAR 1 3 1992

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY
**********

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,

Case Number:

Plaintiff,

921400082

-vs-

Date:

March 17, 1992

SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG,

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendant.
**********

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion
To Dismiss.
The Court having read the Defendant's Motion To
Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Response To Defendant's Motion To
Dismiss and the Defendant's Reply To Plaintiff's Response To
Motion To Dismiss, and having reviewed the file and being fully
informed on the premises makes the following findings and
conclusions:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
1. The Defendant is charged in an Information filed
February 20, 1992 with Ct. I: Aggravated Assault, a Third
Degree Felony alleged to have occurred on or about June 14,
1991, in Utah County, Utah. Ct. II: Possession Of A Dangerous
Weapon By A Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony alleged to
have occurred on or about June 14, 1991, in Utah County, Utah.
Notice is further given in the Information that if a firearm or
a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court may
additionally enhance the sentence of the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
EXHIBIT 16

2. The following calendar of events are m*
between the p a r t i e s :
DATE;
June 14/15, 1991

OCCURRANCE:

The alleged incident involving
defendant occurred.

July 12, 1991

State of Utah filed an Informa

August 5, 1991

The defendant was apprehended
arrested.

August 27, 1991

The Defendant was sent to priso**^
pre-revocation hearing Informatic

September 5, 1991

The Defendant attended a waivez
hearing.

September 19, 1991

The Defendant signed a Notice aiiM
Request For Disposition Pending
Charges. (Exhibit 5 to Defendant?]
Motion To Dismiss.)

October 8, 1991

Receipt of a Notice And Requested;
Disposition Of Pending Charges
Authorized Agent at the Utah StajSef
Prison. (Exhibit 5 to Defendant''*
Motion To Dismiss.)

October 9, 1991

A preliminary hearing was heard \n^cn
Circuit Court. Allegations were raa8jp
that the witnesses had been threatejieig1
with retaliation by the defendant or
members of the defendant's family.,
Witness Amy Sumner was subpoenaed,
appeared and indicated that because of
threats she did not want to testify.
Subpoenaed Chad Grigalda did not
appear. Counsel for the plaintiff#
State of Utah, and defense attorney
John Musselman met with Judge Dimick
in chambers to allow the State to
continue with the preliminary hearing
to question one Raymond Bray, the
investigator hired by the defendant.
Rciymond Bray was placed under oath and
refused to answer questions ^ involving
his actions regarding the witnesses
and his investigation by invoking the
fifth amendment privilege. The
preliminary hearing was reset to
October 21, 1991.

October 11, 1991

Defendant's Notice And Request
Disposition Of Pending Charges
received by the Utah County At to:
Office. (Exhibit 7 to Defendantr"
Motion To Dismiss.)

October 21, 1991

Preliminary hearing resumed with the
defendant and new counsel for the
defendant Jimi Mitsunaga. Counsel, for
the defendant requested that the
preliminary hearing be continued 'so
that he could review the transcripts
of the interviews of witnesses done by
Officer Larsen. Preliminary hearing
continued to October 25, 1991.

October 25, 1991

Preliminary hearing continued, Circuit
Court bound the defendant over to
District Court.

November 15, 1991

Arraignment in District Court. A
Transportation Order was not prepared,
the defendant was not present.
Arraignment continued to November 22,
1991.

November 22, 1991

Defendant arraigned. Trial set for
December 11, 1991 before Judge
Christensen.

December 11, 1991

Parties appeared for trial, jury
called, plaintiff indicated to the
Court and to defense counsel that a
witness, Mr. Hodge, had just been
discovered and was present in court
and ready to testify. Counsel for the
defendant moved to continued the trial
to interview the recently discovered
witness. John Hodge, the recently
discovered witness, had indicated that
he had been contacted by defendant's
sister and through another friend and
had been requested to testify falsely
regarding the defendant's case.
Defendant's counsel requested a
continuance in order to interview Mr.
John Hodge. The Court continued the
trial to January 6, 1992.

A-18(c)

January 6, 1992

Court was ready for trial, the jury
was called, and plaintiff had
previously filed a Motion To Amend The
Information based on additional
information from newly discovered
witnesses. The Court denied the
State's Motion To Amend The
Information, and plaintiff moved to
dismiss the Information against the
defendant. The defendant objected to
the Motion To Dismiss. The Court
granted the Motion To Dismiss.

January 13, 1992

A new Information was sworn to and
issued by the Circuit Court involving
the State of Utah vs. the defendant
herein. This Information is the
subject matter of the current
lawsuit. Defendant appeared for a
first felony appearance on this date.

January 22, 1992

Defendant appeared with new counsel,
Gary Weight, for preliminary hearing.
Mr. Weight moved for a continuance of
the preliminary hearing. Court
granted the defendant's motion to
continue and the preliminary hearing
was set for February 18, 1992.

February 18, 1992

Preliminary hearing was held.
Defendant filed a Motion To Stay
Proceedings pending the outcome of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Court denied
this motion and bound the defendant
over to the District Court to appear
on February 28, 1992.

February 28, 1992

Defendant appeared with Mr.
Gary Weight for arraignment.
Defendant pled not guilty and the
court set a trial date for March 23,
1992.

3. Defendant filed on March 4, 1992 a Motion To
Dismiss alleging that under 77-29-1 U.C.A., the defendant had
given appropriate notice of demand for disposition of pending
charges within 120 days. The defendant has not been tried
within 120 days from the date of the demand, which would be
either October 8, 1991, the date the said demand was

received by the authorized agent at the Utah State Prison or
October 11, 1991, the date that Utah County Attorney received
notice of defendant's demand.
4. Defendant further alleged that his rights have been
violated pursuant to statute and that February 8, 1992 is the
very latest date that the State could have appropriately tried
the defendant. That the Utah County Attorney's Office actually
received notice on the 11th of October, 1991 and 12 0 days added
thereto would be February 8, 1992. Defendant further alleges
that there is no good cause why the defendant could not have
been tried within the 120 days and therefor the court is
mandated to dismiss the action against the defendant.
5. Plaintiff has further alleged that defendant's
continual changing of counsel, request for continuances, and
the defendant's frustration of the plaintiff's case by threats
having been made to witnesses through defendant's family,
friends and/or investigator has delayed bringing the case to
trial. Plaintiff contends that there is good cause shown and
that the Court should not grant the defendant's Motion To
Dismiss.
6. The Court in the review of the record finds that
the defendant's counsel made a motion for continuance on
October 21, 1991 and that the preliminary hearing was continued
from October 21, 1991 to October 25, 1991, a total of four
days. The Court further finds that on December 11,
1991,defendant requested a continuance of the trial to
interview a newly discovered witness and that the trial was
continued to January 6, 1992, a total of 26 days. The Court
further finds that on January 22, 1992 counsel for the
defendant requested a continuance of the preliminary hearing
and the preliminary hearing was continued to February 18, 1992
for a total of 27 days. The Court finds that pursuant to the
defendant's request for continuance, the matter has been
continued for a total of 57 days.

A-18(e)

7.

The Court concludes that from October 20, 1991

through March 23, 1992, (the date set for trial in this matter)
that there would be a total of 164 days elapse since the
defendant gave notice to the Utah County Attorney of his demand
for disposition of pending charges.

The Court relies upon

State of Utah v. Valesquez, 641 P2d 115 (Jan. 8, 1982).

In

that case Justice Hall concluded, "The 42 day postponement
caused by defendant cannot reasonably be included within the 90
day period prescribed by 77-65-1.
U.C.A.)

(Predecessor to 77-29-1

The obvious purpose of this statute is to protect the

constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to
'prevent those charged with enforcement of criminal statutes
from holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed of charges
against him.'

fState v. Wilson, 22 UT2d 361, 453 P2d 158)

When the prisoner himself acts to delay trial on such charges,
he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive this
protection; the purpose behind the statute does no longer
exist.

fState v. Bonnie, 25 UT2d 117, 477 P2d 147)

A

reasonable interpretation 7 7-65-1 U.C.A. requires that the
original 90 day disposition period be extended by the amount of
time during which the defendant himself has created delay."
The Valesquez decision has been followed in the following Utah
cases, State v. Banner, 717 P2d 1325, 1329 and State v. Ossana,
747 P2d 440, 433.
8.

The Court concluding that on March 23, 1992 there

will have elapsed 164 days from the date of the defendant's
demand.

The Court concluding that 57 of those days were due to

defendant's requests for continuances.

The Court in conformity

with the Valesquez decision should add the 57 days to the 12 0
days, for a total of 177 days.

The Trial setting of March 23,

1992 is well within the total of 177 days.
9.
10.

Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is denied.
Counsel for the plaintiff is directed to prepare

and serve on counsel for defendant appropriate Findings,

7V

1 Q < -F V

Conclusions a J Order in accordance with the foregoing, and
then submit such documents to the Court for signature.
Dated at Provor UT this 17th^jday^of March, 1992.
JURTJ

L. PARK, JUDGE

cc;

Sherry Ragan
Gary Weight
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FILED
Fourth -judicial District Court
of Utah County, Stat* of Utah
CAflMA 9 SMITH, Cttr*
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Deputy
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
**********

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
AND COMMITMENT

-vs-

CASE NUMBER:

SIOUDONE PHATHAMMAVONG,

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

Defendant.

921400082

Rpt. Richard Tatton, CSR
Clerk:

Laurie Hinton

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for
pronouncement of judgment and sentence on the 8th day of May
1992. Deputy Utah County Attorney Sherry Ragan appeared for
and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant appeared in
person and was represented by attorney Gary Weight. The Court,
having reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and being
fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the
following Judgment, Sentence and Commitment:
J U D G M E N T
The defendant on the 23rd day of March, 1992, having
been convicted by a jury with a verdict of guilty of the
offense of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, as
charged in the Information; the Court finding no legal reason
why judgment should not be pronounced, it is ordered and
adjudged that the defendant: is guilty as charged and convicted.
Mr. Weight motioned the Court to arrest judgment on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Ms. Ragan responded. Court
has previously made findings and a ruling on this matter.
Court denied the motion.
Mr. Weight motioned the Court for leave to withdraw as
counsel for the defendant after sentencing.
EXHIBIT 17

S E N T E N C E
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
defendant Sioudone Phathammavong is sentenced to be confined in
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five (5) years.

Court further ordered that the sentence

may run concurrently with any other sentence that the defendant
is now serving,
C O M M I T M E N T
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the
Department Of Corrections to be transported to the Warden of
the Utah State Prison in execution of this judgment and
sentence,
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S
Pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated 77-27-13(5), the
Court provides the following information;
(a)

TERMS FOR WHICH THE OFFENDER, IN THE OPINION OF

THE COURT, SHOULD BE IMPRISONED:

As prescribed in the Utah

Sentence and Release Guidelines.
(b)

CHARACTER OF THE OFFENDER:

Unknown

(c)

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:

Unknown

(d)

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:

Unknown

Dated this 8th day of May, 199
/BY TH£
^-^/BOYD'L. PARK, JUDGE
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D. JOHN MUSSELMAN (5582) for:
ELKINS & MUSSELMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, UT 84601
Telephone: 374-1212
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH,
NOTICE OF APPEAL /
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 911400516

SIOUDONNE PHATHAMMAVONG,
Defendant.
oooOooo
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his counsel of record, D.
JOHN MUSSELMAN, and does hereby give notice of his intent to appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals from that certain JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE AND
COMMITMENT entered in the above cause on May 8, 1992, a copy of which
is attached hereto and made a part hereof by this reference.
DATED this f2Z^

day of May, 1992.

D. JOHN MUSSELMAN
Attorney for Defendant

EXHIBIT 18
A-20
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M A I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice ot Appeal, postage prepaid, to Carlyle Kay Bryson,
100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT »460h, this

£-P-~-

1992.

OAs-L. . Af.-c
D. >TOHN MUSSELMAN

A-20(b)

day of May,

